Metropolitan
Wirral

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Internal Audit Report

Review:
Building Security

Prepared by :   Ian Benjamin, Graduate Trainee (Internal Audit)

Authorised by :   Laura Williams, Principal Auditor

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INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT
Building Security

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Tel No: 666 3289 – Ian Benjamin
Email: ianbenjamin@wirral.gov.uk

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 A review of the building security arrangements and procedures at the main Council complexes has recently been completed by Internal Audit at the request of the Chief Executive.

1.2 The complexes reviewed were Solar Campus; Westminster House; the Hamilton Building; the Wallasey Complex; Cheshire Lines; the Conway, Municipal and Treasury Buildings; the Bebington Complex; Liscard Municipal Offices and Castle Chambers.

1.3 The work undertaken covered policies, procedures and the physical security arrangements at the complexes. This incorporated building access and control for staff and visitors as well as contractors and vendors. Other areas investigated included emergency procedures, security training and staff working out of the office. The processes relating to ID cards, assets and incident recording were also examined.

1.4 This report summarises the findings highlighted and the recommendations made at each of the Complexes.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 Building security procedures have been reviewed by Internal Audit.

2.2 Numerous members of staff across all departments were interviewed concerning their specific areas of responsibility. Others were contacted to obtain further information.

2.3 A Building Security questionnaire was completed with the appropriate complex managers and further observations were made. Documented policies and procedures were also examined where available.

2.4 The findings have been discussed with the relevant contacts and reports have now been issued to all complex managers.

2.5 The main findings of the review were:

2.5.1 None of the complexes visited possessed a written security policy which detailed the appropriate local security procedures and staff responsibilities.

2.5.2 Formal risk assessments, including fire risk assessments, were not always performed on a regular basis. The Health and Safety Fire Policy had therefore not been updated in all cases and, in one case, the fire assembly points also needed to be reviewed. Elsewhere, it was not known whether a fire risk assessment was held in accordance with the Fire Safety Order 2006.

2.5.3 A bomb incident plan was not available in any of the complexes visited.

2.5.4 In some cases, it was not possible to establish whether the burglar alarms were tested on a regular basis as specific records of the testing were not maintained. It was also not known whether the fire alarm was connected to Wirral Community Patrol or the Fire Service in one of these complexes.

2.5.5 It was not known in all cases whether buildings would be secure in the event of a power failure.

2.5.6 Not all staff were issued with ID cards and ID and access cards were not always issued to all staff through the same source. Standard forms were often not used for the issue of new/replacement access cards, ID cards or key fobs. Stock records of the access cards, ID cards or key fobs were also not maintained in all cases. In one case, key fobs and ID cards were not stored in a secure location prior to being issued to staff, while the return of ID and access cards was not included as a standard item in the exit process.

2.5.7 Guidance was not always issued to all staff on the use of assets off site.

2.5.8 A security incident report book was often not available or not reviewed on a regular basis. Furthermore, mechanisms were not always in place to allow information regarding security issues to be shared between sections and departments.

2.5.9 In some cases, advice regarding crime prevention was also not obtained from the police and no mechanisms were in place for continuing liaison with the police.

2.6 The main recommendations of the review were:

2.6.1 As a draft security policy is now being considered by the Complex Managers' Group, the recommendation regarding this issue can be stated as:
   a) The draft security policy should be adapted to reflect local procedures and staff responsibilities.
   b) The security policy should be formalised and distributed to all staff and be included within the induction process for new starters.
   c) The formalised security policy should be reviewed regularly.
   d) The policy should cover such areas as building evacuation, security breaches, fire warnings and bomb threats.

2.6.2 It should be confirmed whether complexes hold a fire risk assessment. If not, one should be obtained in accordance with the Fire Safety Order 2006.

2.6.3 A bomb incident plan should be implemented for every complex.

2.6.4 Burglar alarms should be tested on a regular basis and a record of the testing should be maintained.

2.6.5 It should be confirmed whether the fire alarm is connected to an appropriate service. If it is not then arrangements should be made to ensure that the fire alarm promptly notifies an appropriate body in the event of a fire.

2.6.6 It should be confirmed whether the building would be safe in the event of a power failure. If the building would not be secure then controls should be put in place to maintain security should such an event occur. These controls should be tested regularly to verify that they are working effectively.

2.6.7 A standard form should be used for the issue of new or replacement ID cards, access cards and key fobs.

2.6.8 A stock record should be maintained of all ID cards, access cards and key fobs and a stock taking exercise periodically undertaken.

2.6.9 Key fobs and ID cards should be stored in a secure location.

2.6.10 The return of all relevant cards should be included in the standard exit interview form or other appropriate documentation.

2.6.11 The inventory should be updated to reflect the current situation at the complex.

2.6.12 A Security Incident Report Book should be maintained, detailing all security breaches /incidents and this should be reviewed regularly by senior management. All staff should be made aware of the requirements to report security breaches/incidents for inclusion within the report book.

2.6.13 A system should be established for continuing liaison with the police.

2.6.14 The Complex Manager should ensure that he/she is aware of all security issues relating to the complex and that he/she co-ordinates the dissemination of relevant information to all appropriate staff and section heads.

3. AUDIT BRIEF

3.1 An audit brief was prepared providing details of all the areas of coverage.

3.2 Included in the remit of the review was the requirement to utilise a security questionnaire to confirm that robust procedures are in place.

3.3 Also incorporated was the need to visit all of the complexes identified to appraise the procedures actually being used for building security through discussion with the relevant complex manager. In addition, observations were to be made and appropriate documentation examined.

3.4 As this would coincide with work undertaken by Simon Parrott in his role as Legislative Compliance Officer, it was also decided to discuss the building security audit programme with him to ensure that work was not duplicated.

4. WORK UNDERTAKEN

4.1 Numerous members of staff were interviewed in relation to their specific areas of responsibility. They were:
- Jill Bennett, Head of Service, Children and Young People's Department;
- Phil Ashley, Service Manager, Adult Social Services Department;
- Norman Daulby, Head of Staffing and Support Services, Children and Young People's Department;
- Peter Goodman, Wallasey Facilities Superintendent, Corporate Services Department;
- Rob Dolphin, Assistant Director, Technical Services Department;
- Sara Wrench, Administration Assistant, Children and Young People's Department;
- Dawn Kenny, PA to Director of Children's Services, Children and Young People's Department;
- Stephen Rowley, Assistant Director, Finance Department;
- John Carruthers, Assistant Director, Finance Department;
- Graham Knowles, Halls Manager, Regeneration Department;
- Les Woods, Business Strategy Co-ordinator, Technical Services Department;
- Pat Traynor, Administration Officer, Merseyside Pension Fund.

4.2 Other members of staff were also contacted to clarify points or to obtain further information. These included:
- Simon Parrott, Legislative Compliance Officer, Technical Services Department;
- Dave McAlister, Administration Officer, Finance Department;
- Kris Ng, Housing Benefit Assistant Manager, Finance Department;
- Andrea Bruffell, Corporate Call Centre Manager, Finance Department;
- Ray Olson, Building Attendant, Finance Department;
- Peter Mawdsley, Principal Pensions Officer, Merseyside Pension Fund.

4.3 The security arrangements and procedures in nine complexes were examined and a questionnaire was completed with the complex managers or appropriate contacts. They were:

Complex	Complex Manager/Contact
Solar Campus	Jill Bennett
Westminster House	Phil Ashley
Hamilton Building	Norman Daulby
Wallasey Complex	Peter Goodman
Cheshire Lines	Rob Dolphin
Conway, Municipal and Treasury Buildings	John Carruthers/Stephen Rowley
Bebington Complex	Graham Knowles
Liscard Municipal Offices	Les Woods
Castle Chambers	Pat Traynor

4.4 It should also be noted that a separate report was issued to the Children and Young People's Department concerning the control of ID cards and key fobs. The procedures in this area are managed centrally within the Department.

4.5 Copies of all reports were also issued to Simon Parrott so that he may follow up on the recommendations made in his work regarding legislative compliance.

5. AUDIT OPINION

5.1 As a number of weaknesses were identified, the audit of each complex identified that the systems in place for building security are less than satisfactory.

6. FINDINGS

6.1 A number of findings were highlighted for each of the Complexes. The most significant of these are:

Finding	Solar Campus	Westminster House	Hamilton Building	Wallasey Complex	Cheshire Lines	Conway, Municipal and Treasury	Bebington Complex	Liscard Complex	Castle Chambers
Documented security policy not in existence detailing local procedures.	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Complex Manager not formally trained.	✔								
Complex Manager not designated.									✔
Formal risk assessments not performed regularly.		✔					✔		
Health and Safety Fire policy not updated and fire risk assessments not performed regularly.						✔	✔	✔	
Bomb incident plan not available.		✔					✔		
Burglar alarm tests not evidenced.			✔			✔			
CCTV not in operation.	✔						✔		
Vulnerable doors and windows not protected by shutters or grilles.					✔		✔	✔	
Door entry codes not changed regularly.	✔					✔			
No documented list of key holders.			✔		✔	✔			
Not aware if complex secure in the event of power failure.			✔		✔				
Standard forms not used for issue of access cards.	✔	✔	✔		✔		✔		✔
Stock records of access cards not maintained.	✔	✔	✔	✔					
Key fobs and ID cards not stored securely.				✔					
Return of access cards not included as standard item at exit interviews.				✔					
Badges not issued to visitors.	✔						✔		✔
Deliveries not always signed for.					✔				
Guidance not issued re use of assets off site.		✔			✔	✔			
Security incident report book not maintained.	✔	✔			✔	✔			✔
Crime prevention not advertised and promoted within the complex.	✔			✔	✔	✔	✔		
No system for liaison with police.					✔			✔	✔

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Recommendations have been made for each complex visited and these are currently being considered by the relevant complex managers. The most significant are:

7.1.1 As a draft security policy is now in existence, the recommendation regarding this issue can be stated as:
   a) The draft security policy should be adapted to reflect local procedures and staff responsibilities.
   b) The security policy should be formalised and distributed to all staff and be included within the induction process for new starters.
   c) The formalised security policy should be reviewed regularly.
   d) The policy should cover such areas as building evacuation, security breaches, fire warnings and bomb threats.

Complexes – Solar Campus; Westminster House; the Hamilton Building; the Wallasey Complex; Cheshire Lines; the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings; the Bebington Complex; Liscard Municipal Offices and Castle Chambers.

7.1.2 The Complex Manager should receive formal security training.

Complex – Solar Campus.

7.1.3 This recommendation was made to the Merseyside Pension Fund who share their office building with organisations from outside the Authority:
   a) A member of staff should be designated the Complex Manager for those areas of Castle Chambers occupied by the Merseyside Pension Fund.
   b) The Complex Manager should receive formal training relating to security issues.
   c) The Complex Manager should also arrange to attend the reconvened meetings of the Complex Managers' Group to allow information and best practice to be shared across the Authority.

Complex – Castle Chambers.

7.1.4 A formal risk assessment should be performed and recorded on a regular basis including the review of employees working alone.

Complexes – Westminster House and the Bebington Complex.

7.1.5 It should be noted that part (c) of this recommendation relates to the Bebington Complex only:
   a) The Health and Safety Fire policy should be updated.
   b) Fire risk assessments should also be performed on a regular basis.
   c) The fire assembly points should be reviewed.

Complexes – the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings; the Bebington Complex and Liscard Municipal Offices.

7.1.6 A bomb incident plan should be implemented for the complex.

Complexes – Westminster House and the Bebington Complex.

7.1.7 Burglar alarms should be tested on a regular basis and a record of the testing should be maintained.

Complexes – the Hamilton Building and the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings.

7.1.8 Consideration should be given to the installation of CCTV cameras throughout the complex.

Complexes – Solar Campus and the Bebington Complex.

7.1.9 Consideration should be given to the installation of shutters and grilles on all vulnerable windows and doors.

Complexes – Cheshire Lines; the Bebington Complex and Liscard Municipal Offices.

7.1.10 Door entry codes, where used, should be changed on a regular basis. A record should be maintained of door entry code changes which details the date changed and the officer responsible.

Complexes – Solar Campus and the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings.

7.1.11 A list of key holders for the complex should be clearly documented.

Complexes – the Hamilton Building; Cheshire Lines and the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings.

7.1.12 It should be confirmed whether the building would be safe in the event of a power failure. If the building would not be secure then controls should be put in place to maintain security should such an event occur. These controls should be tested regularly to verify that they are working effectively.

Complexes – the Hamilton Building and Cheshire Lines.

7.1.13 A standard form should be used for the issue of new or replacement ID cards, access cards and key fobs.

Complexes – Solar Campus; Westminster House; the Hamilton Building; Cheshire Lines; the Bebington Complex and Castle Chambers.

7.1.14 Stock records of access cards, ID cards and key fobs are not always maintained.

Complexes – Solar Campus, Westminster House, Hamilton Building and Wallasey Complex.

7.1.15 Key fobs and ID cards should be stored in a secure location.

Complex – Westminster House.

7.1.16 The return of all relevant cards should be included in the standard exit interview form or other appropriate documentation.

Complex – Westminster House.

7.1.17 Badges should be issued to all visitors and should be worn at all times whilst the visitor is on site.

A visitor's book should be adopted which details name of visitor/contractor, date, person/area visiting, nature of visit, vehicle registration, time of arrival and time of departure.(Castle Chambers only)

Complexes – Solar Campus; the Bebington Complex and Castle Chambers.

7.1.18 Instructions should be given to ensure that all deliveries of goods and supplies are taken to the building reception.

Complex – Cheshire Lines.

7.1.19 The Complex Manager should instruct all section heads within the complex to issue guidance to their staff on the use of assets off site.

Complexes – Westminster House; Cheshire Lines and the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings.

7.1.20 A Security Incident Report Book should be maintained, detailing all security breaches /incidents and this should be reviewed regularly by senior management.
All staff should be made aware of the requirements to report security breaches/incidents for inclusion within the report book.

Complexes – Solar Campus; Westminster House; Cheshire Lines; the Conway, Municipal and Treasury buildings and Castle Chambers.

7.1.21 Crime prevention should be prominently advertised within the complex.

Complexes – Solar Campus; the Wallasey Complex; Cheshire Lines; the Conway, Municipal and Treasury Buildings and the Bebington Complex.

7.1.22 A system should be established for a continuing liaison with the police.

Complexes – Cheshire Lines; Liscard Municipal Offices and Castle Chambers.

8. CONCLUSION

8.1 The recommendations listed in this report have all been issued to the relevant complex managers for their consideration. The recently reconvened Complex Managers' Group may be an appropriate forum for the further discussion of these recommendations and may lead to their more effective implementation.

I would like to thank the various complex managers for their help and co-operation during this work. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any further information.

Laura A. Williams
Principal Auditor